Privacy-preserving Decentralized Optimization via Decomposition by Zhang, Chunlei et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
09
56
6v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
8 S
ep
 20
18
Privacy-preserving Decentralized Optimization via Decomposition
Chunlei Zhang and Huan Gao and Yongqiang Wang
Abstract—This paper considers the problem of privacy-
preservation in decentralized optimization, in which N agents
cooperatively minimize a global objective function that is the
sum of N local objective functions. We assume that each local
objective function is private and only known to an individ-
ual agent. To cooperatively solve the problem, most existing
decentralized optimization approaches require participating
agents to exchange and disclose estimates to neighboring agents.
However, this results in leakage of private information about
local objective functions, which is undesirable when adversaries
exist and try to steal information from participating agents. To
address this issue, we propose a privacy-preserving decentral-
ized optimization approach based on proximal Jacobian ADMM
via function decomposition. Numerical simulations confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of privacy-preservation in decen-
tralized optimization whereN agents cooperatively minimize
a global objective function of the following form:
min
x˜
f¯(x˜) =
N∑
i=1
fi(x˜), (1)
where variable x˜ ∈ Rn is common to all agents, function fi :
R
n → R is a private local objective function of agent i. This
problem has found wide applications in various domains,
ranging from rendezvous in multi-agent systems [1], support
vector machine [2] and classification [3] in machine learning,
source localization in sensor networks [4], to data regression
in statistics [5], [6].
To solve the optimization problem (1) in an decentralized
manner, different algorithms were proposed in recent years,
including the distributed (sub)gradient algorithm [7], aug-
mented Lagrangian methods (ALM) [8], and the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) as well as its
variants [8]–[11]. Among existing approaches, ADMM has
attracted tremendous attention due to its wide applications [9]
and fast convergence rate in both primal and dual iterations
[11]. ADMM yields a convergence rate of O(1/k) when
the local objective functions fi are convex and a Q-linear
convergence rate when all the local objective functions are
strongly convex [12]. In addition, a recent work shows that
ADMM can achieve a Q-linear convergence rate even when
the local objective functions are only convex (subject to
the constraint that the global objective function is strongly
convex) [13].
On the other hand, privacy has become one of the key
concerns. For example, in source localization, participating
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agents may want to reach consensus on the source position
without revealing their position information [14]. In the ren-
dezvous problem, a group of individuals may want to meet
at an agreed time and place [1] without leaking their initial
locations [15]. In the business sector, independent companies
may want to work together to complete a common business
for mutual benefit but without sharing their private data [16].
In the agreement problem [17], a group of organizations may
want to reach consensus on a subject without leaking their
individual opinions to others [15].
One widely used approach to enabling privacy-
preservation in decentralized optimization is differential
privacy [18]–[21] which protects sensitive information
by adding carefully-designed noise to exchanged states
or objective functions. However, adding noise also
compromises the accuracy of optimization results and
causes a fundamental trade-off between privacy and
accuracy [18]–[20]. In fact, approaches based on differential
privacy may fail to converge to the accurate optimization
result even without noise perturbation [20]. It is worth
noting that there exists some differential-privacy based
optimization approaches which are able to converge to the
accurate optimization result in the mean-square sense, e.g.
[22], [23]. However, those results require the assistance of a
third party such as a cloud [22], [23], and therefore cannot
be applied to the completely decentralized setting where
no third parties exist. Encryption-based approaches are also
commonly used to enable privacy-preservation [24]–[26].
However, such approaches unavoidably bring about extra
computational and communication burden for real-time
optimization [27]. Another approach to enabling privacy
preservation in linear multi-agent networks is observability-
based design [28], [29], which protects agents’ information
from non-neighboring agents through properly designing
the weights of the communication graph. However, this
approach cannot protect the privacy of adversary’s direct
neighbors.
To enable privacy in decentralized optimization without
incurring large communication/computational overhead or
compromising algorithmic accuracy, we propose a novel
privacy solution through function decomposition. In the op-
timization literature, privacy has been defined as preserving
the confidentiality of agents’ states [22], (sub)gradients or
objective functions [20], [30], [31]. In this paper, we define
privacy as the non-disclosure of agents’ (sub)gradients. We
protect agents’ (sub)gradients because in many decentralized
optimization applications, subgradients contain sensitive in-
formation such as salary or medical record [26], [30].
Contributions: We proposed a privacy-preserving decen-
tralized optimization approach through function decompo-
sition. In contrast to differential-privacy based approaches
which use noise to cover sensitive information and are sub-
ject to a fundamental trade-off between privacy and accuracy,
our approach can enable privacy preservation without sacri-
ficing accuracy. Compared with encryption-based approaches
which suffer from heavy computational and communication
burden, our approach incurs little extra computational and
communication overhead.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as
follows: Sec. II introduces the attack model and presents the
proximal Jacobian ADMM solution to (1). Then a completely
decentralized privacy-preserving approach to problem (1) is
proposed in Sec. III. Rigorous analysis of the guaranteed
privacy and convergence is addressed in Sec. IV and Sec.
V, respectively. Numerical simulation results are provided
in Sec. VI to confirm the effectiveness and computational
efficiency of the proposed approach. In the end, we draw
conclusions in Sec. VII.
II. BACKGROUND
We first introduce the attack model considered in this
paper. Then we present the proximal Jacobian ADMM
algorithm for decentralized optimization.
A. Attack Model
We consider two types of adversaries in this paper:Honest-
but-curious adversaries and External eavesdroppers. Honest-
but-curious adversaries are agents who follow all protocol
steps correctly but are curious and collect all intermediate
and input/output data in an attempt to learn some information
about other participating agents [32]. External eavesdroppers
are adversaries who steal information through wiretapping
all communication channels and intercepting messages ex-
changed between agents.
B. Proximal Jacobian ADMM
The decentralized problem (1) can be formulated as fol-
lows: each fi in (1) is private and only known to agent i,
and all N agents form a bidirectional connected network,
which is denoted by a graph G = (V,E). V denotes the
set of agents, E denotes the set of communication links
(undirected edges) between agents, and |E| denotes the
number of communication links (undirected edges) in E. If
there exists a communication link between agents i and j,
we say that agent i and agent j are neighbors and the link
is denoted as ei,j ∈ E if i < j is true or ej,i ∈ E otherwise.
Moreover, the set of all neighboring agents of i is denoted as
Ni and the number of agents in Ni is denoted as Di. Then
problem (1) can be rewritten as
min
xi∈Rn, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
subject to xi = xj , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
(2)
where xi is a copy of x˜ and belongs to agent i. Using
the following proximal Jacobian ADMM [33], an optimal
solution to (1) can be achieved at each agent:
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Fig. 1: Function-decomposition based privacy-preserving de-
centralized optimization. (a) Before function decomposition
(b) after function decomposition.


xk+1i = argmin
xi
fi(xi) +
γiρ
2
‖ xi − xki ‖2
+
∑
j∈Ni
(λkTi,j (xi − xkj ) +
ρ
2
‖ xi − xkj ‖2),(3)
λk+1i,j = λ
k
i,j + ρ(x
k+1
i − xk+1j ), ∀j ∈ Ni. (4)
Here, k is the iteration index, γi > 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , N)
are proximal coefficients, ρ is the penalty parameter, which
is a positive constant scalar. λi,j and λj,i are Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the constraint xi = xj , ei,j ∈
E. It is worth noting that similar to our prior work [26], both
λi,j and λj,i are introduced for the constraint xi = xj , ei,j ∈
E in (3)-(4) to unify the algorithm description. By setting
λ0i,j = ρ(x
0
i − x0j) at t = 0, we have λki,j = −λkj,i holding
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j ∈ Ni. In this way, the update rule
of agent i can be unified without separating i > j and i < j
for j ∈ Ni, as shown in (3).
The proximal Jacobian ADMM is effective in solving
(1). However, it cannot protect the privacy of participating
agents’ gradients as states xki are exchanged and disclosed
explicitly among neighboring agents. So adversaries can
easily derive ▽fi(x
k
i ) explicitly for k = 1, 2, . . . according to
the update rules in (3) and (4) by leveraging the knowledge
of γi.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DECENTRALIZED
OPTIMIZATION
The key idea of our approach to enabling privacy-
preservation is to randomly decompose each fi into two parts
fαki and f
βk
i under the constraint fi = f
αk
i +f
βk
i . The index
k of functions fαki and f
βk
i indicates that functions f
αk
i
and fβki can be time-varying. However, it should be noticed
that the sum of fαki and f
βk
i is time invariant and always
equals to fi. We let the function f
αk
i succeed the role of
the original function fi in inter-agent interactions while the
other function fβki involves only by interacting with f
αk
i , as
shown in Fig. 1.
After the function decomposition, problem (1) can be
rewritten as
min
x
α
i
,x
β
i
∈Rn, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
(fαki (x
α
i ) + f
βk
i (x
β
i ))
subject to xαi = x
α
j , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
xαi = x
β
i , ∀i ∈ V,
(5)
and the associated augmented Lagrangian function is
Lkρ(x,λ) =
N∑
i=1
(fαki (x
α
i ) + f
βk
i (x
β
i ))
+
∑
ei,j∈E
(λαTi,j (x
α
i − xαj ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαj ‖2)
+
∑
i∈V
(λαβTi,i (x
α
i − xβi ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − xβi ‖2).
(6)
where x = [xαT1 ,x
βT
1 ,x
αT
2 ,x
βT
2 , . . . ,x
αT
N ,x
βT
N ]
T ∈ R2Nn
is the augmented state. λαi,j is the Lagrange multiplier cor-
responding to the constraint xαi = x
α
j , λ
αβ
i,i is the Lagrange
multiplier corresponding to the constraint xαi = x
β
i , and all
λαi,j and λ
αβ
i,i are stacked into λ. ρ is the penalty parameter,
which is a positive constant scalar. It is worth noting that
each agent i does not need to know the associated augmented
Lagrangian function (i.e., other agents’ objective functions)
to update its states xαi and x
β
i , as shown below in (7) and
(8).
Based on Jacobian update, we can solve (5) by applying
the following iterations for i = 1, 2, . . . , N :


x
α(k+1)
i = argmin
x
α
i
γαi ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαki ‖2
+Lk+1ρ (xαk1 ,xβk1 , . . . ,xαi ,xβki , . . . ,xαkN ,xβkN ,λk)
= argmin
x
α
i
f
α(k+1)
i (x
α
i ) +
γαi ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαki ‖2
+
∑
j∈Ni
(λαkTi,j (x
α
i − xαkj ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαkj ‖2)
+λαβkTi,i (x
α
i − xβki ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − xβki ‖2, (7)
x
β(k+1)
i = argmin
x
β
i
γβi ρ
2
‖ xβi − xβki ‖2
+Lk+1ρ (xαk1 ,xβk1 , . . . ,xαki ,xβi , . . . ,xαkN ,xβkN ,λk)
= argmin
x
β
i
f
β(k+1)
i (x
β
i ) +
γβi ρ
2
‖ xβi − xβki ‖2
+λβαkTi,i (x
β
i − xαki ) +
ρ
2
‖ xβi − xαki ‖2, (8)
λ
α(k+1)
i,j = λ
αk
i,j + ρ(x
α(k+1)
i − xα(k+1)j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (9)
λ
αβ(k+1)
i,i = λ
αβk
i,i + ρ(x
α(k+1)
i − xβ(k+1)i ), (10)
λ
βα(k+1)
i,i = λ
βαk
i,i + ρ(x
β(k+1)
i − xα(k+1)i ). (11)
Here, similar to our prior work [26] and algorithm (3)-(4),
both λαi,j and λ
α
j,i are introduced for the constraint x
α
i =
xαj , ei,j ∈ E in (7)-(11) to unify the algorithm description.
Similarly, both λ
αβ
i,i and λ
βα
i,i are introduced for the constraint
xαi = x
β
i in (7)-(11) to unify the algorithm description.
Next we give in detail our privacy-preserving function-
decomposition based algorithm.
Algorithm I
Initial Setup: For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i initializes
xα0i and x
β0
i , and exchanges x
α0
i with neighboring agents.
Then agent i sets λα0i,j = x
α0
i − xα0j , λαβ0i,i = xα0i − xβ0i ,
and λ
βα0
i,i = x
β0
i − xα0i .
Input: xαki , λ
αk
i,j , λ
αβk
i,i , x
βk
i , λ
βαk
i,i .
Output: x
α(k+1)
i , λ
α(k+1)
i,j , λ
αβ(k+1)
i,i , x
β(k+1)
i , λ
βα(k+1)
i,i .
1) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i constructs f
α(k+1)
i and
f
β(k+1)
i under the constraint fi = f
α(k+1)
i + f
β(k+1)
i ;
2) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i updates x
α(k+1)
i and
x
β(k+1)
i according to the update rules in (7) and (8),
respectively;
3) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i sends x
α(k+1)
i to
neighboring agents;
4) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i computes λ
α(k+1)
i,j ,
λ
αβ(k+1)
i,i and λ
βα(k+1)
i,i according to (9)-(11);
5) Set k to k + 1, and go to 1).
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we rigorously prove that each agent’s
gradient of local objective function ▽fj cannot be inferred by
honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers.
Theorem 1: In Algorithm I, agent j’s gradient of local
objective function ▽fj at any point except the optimal
solution will not be revealed to an honest-but-curious agent
i.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious adversary
agent i collects information from K iterations to infer the
gradient ▽fj of a neighboring agent j. The adversary agent i
can establish 2nK equations relevant to ▽fj by making use
of the fact that the update rules of (7) and (8) are publicly
known, i.e.,


▽fα1j (x
α1
j ) + (γ
α
j +Dj + 1)ρx
α1
j − γαj ρxα0j
+
∑
m∈Nj
(λα0j,m − ρxα0m ) + λαβ0j,j − ρxβ0j = 0,
▽fβ1j (x
β1
j ) + (γ
β
j + 1)ρx
β1
j − γβj ρxβ0j + λβα0j,j − ρxα0j = 0,
...
▽fαKj (x
αK
j ) + (γ
α
j +Dj + 1)ρx
αK
j − γαj ρxα(K−1)j +∑
m∈Nj
(λ
α(K−1)
j,m − ρxα(K−1)m ) + λαβ(K−1)j,j − ρxβ(K−1)j = 0,
▽fβKj (x
βK
j ) + (γ
β
j + 1)ρx
βK
j − γβj ρxβ(K−1)j
+ λ
βα(K−1)
j,j − ρxα(K−1)j = 0.
(12)
In the system of 2nK equations (12), ▽fαkj (x
αk
j ) (k =
1, 2, . . . ,K), ▽fβkj (x
βk
j ) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), γ
α
j , γ
β
j , and
x
βk
j (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K) are unknown to adversary agent
i. Parameters xαkm ,m 6= j and λαkj,m,m 6= j are known
to adversary agent i only when agent m and agent i are
neighbors. So the above system of 2nK equations contains
at least 3nK+n+2 unknown variables, and adversary agent
i cannot infer the gradient of local objective function ▽fj
by solving (12).
It is worth noting that after the optimization algorithm
converges, adversary agent i can have another piece of
information according to the KKT conditions [33]:
▽fj(x
∗
j ) = −
∑
m∈Nj
λα∗j,m. (13)
If agent j’s neighbors are also neighbors to agent i, the exact
gradient of fj at the optimal solution can be inferred by
an honest-but-curious agent i. Therefore, agent j’s gradient
of local objective function ▽fj will not be revealed to an
honest-but-curious agent i at any point except the optimal
solution.
Corollary 1: In Algorithm I, agent j’s gradient of local
objective function ▽fj at any point except the optimal
solution will not be revealed to external eavesdroppers.
Proof: The proof can be obtained following a similar
line of reasoning of Theorem 1. External eavesdroppers
can also establish a system of 2nK equations (12) to
infer agent j’s gradient ▽fj . However, the number of un-
knowns ▽fαkj (x
αk
j ) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), ▽f
βk
j (x
βk
j ) (k =
1, 2, . . . ,K), γαj , γ
β
j , and x
βk
j (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K) adds up
to 3nk+n+2, making the system of equations established by
the external eavesdropper undetermined. Therefore, external
eavesdroppers cannot infer the gradient of local objective
function ▽fj at any point except the optimal solution.
Remark 1: It is worth noting that if multiple adversary
agents cooperate to infer the information of agent j, they
can only establish a system of 2nK equations containing at
least 3nK+n+2 unknown variables as well. Therefore, our
algorithm can protect the privacy of agents against multiple
honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we rigorously prove the convergence of
Algorithm I under the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Each local function fi : R
n → R is
strongly convex and continuously differentiable, i.e.,
(▽fi(x˜)− ▽fi(y˜))T (x˜− y˜) ≥ mi ‖ x˜− y˜ ‖2 .
In addition, there exists a lower bound mf > 0 such that
mi ≥ 2mf , ∀i = {1, 2, . . . , N} is true.
Assumption 2: Each private local function fi : R
n → R
has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e.,
‖ ▽fi(x˜)− ▽fi(y˜) ‖≤ Li ‖ x˜− y˜ ‖ .
Assumption 3: fαki is chosen under the following condi-
tions:
1) fαki is strongly convex and differentiable, i.e.,
(▽fαki (x˜)− ▽fαki (y˜))T (x˜− y˜) ≥ mf ‖ x˜− y˜ ‖2 .
agent i
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agent N
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agent 2i-1
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2Nh 2ih
2 1Nh −
agent 2
agent 4
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(b) Virtual network G′ = (V ′, E′) of
2N agents
Fig. 2: Function-decomposition based privacy-preserving de-
centralized optimization equals to converting the original
network into a virtual network G′ = (V ′, E′) of 2N agents.
2) fβki = fi − fαki is strongly convex and differentiable,
i.e.,
(▽fβki (x˜)− ▽fβki (y˜))T (x˜− y˜) ≥ mf ‖ x˜− y˜ ‖2 .
3) fαki has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e. there exists
an L < +∞ such that
‖ ▽fαki (x˜)− ▽fαki (y˜) ‖≤ L ‖ x˜− y˜ ‖ .
4) fβki = fi−fαki has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e.
there exists an L < +∞ such that
‖ ▽fβki (x˜)− ▽fβki (y˜) ‖≤ L ‖ x˜− y˜ ‖ .
5) lim
k→∞
fαki → fα∗i and fαki (x˜) is bounded when x˜ is
bounded.
It is worth noting that under Assumption 1 and Assump-
tion 2, fαki can be easily designed to meet Assumption
3. A quick example is fαki (x˜) =
mf
2 x˜
T x˜ + bkTi x˜ where
bki ∈ Rn can be time-varying, and satisfies lim
k→∞
bki → b∗i
and −∞ <‖ bki ‖<∞.
Because the function decomposition process amounts to
converting the original network to a virtual network G′ =
(V ′, E′) of 2N agents, as shown in Fig. 2, we analyze
the convergence of our algorithm based on the virtual net-
work G′ = (V ′, E′). To simplify and unify the notations,
we relabel the local objective functions fαki and f
βk
i for
all i = 1, 2, . . . , N as hk1 , h
k
2 , . . . , h
k
2N . We relabel the
associated states xαki and x
βk
i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N
as xk1 ,x
k
2 , . . . ,x
k
2N . In addition, we relabel parameters
γαi and γ
β
i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N correspondingly as
γ1, γ2, . . . , γ2N . Then problem (5) can be rewritten as
min
xi∈Rn, i∈{1,2,...,2N}
2N∑
i=1
hki (xi)
subject to Ax = 0
(14)
where x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , . . . ,x
T
2N ]
T ∈ R2Nn and A = [am,l] ⊗
In ∈ R|E′|n×2Nn is the edge-node incidence matrix of graph
G′ as defined in [34]. Parameter am,l is defined as
am,l =


1 if the mth edge originates from agent l,
−1 if the mth edge terminates at agent l,
0 otherwise.
We define each edge ei,j originating from i and terminating
at j and denote an edge as ei,j ∈ E′ if i < j is true or
ej,i ∈ E′ otherwise.
Denote the iterating results in the kth step in Algorithm I
as follows:
xk = [xkT1 ,x
kT
2 , . . . ,x
kT
2N ]
T ∈ R2Nn,
λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E′ ∈ R|E
′|n,
yk = [xkT ,λkT ]T ∈ R(|E′|+2N)n
Further augment the coefficients γi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N) into
the matrix form
U = diag{γ1, γ2, . . . , γ2N} ⊗ In ∈ R2Nn×2Nn,
and Di into the matrix form
D = diag{D1, D2, . . . , D2N} ⊗ In ∈ R2Nn×2Nn.
Now we are in position to give the main results for this
section:
Lemma 1: Let x∗ be the optimal solution, λk∗ be the
optimal multiplier to (14) at iteration k, and yk∗ =
[x∗T ,λk∗T ]T . Further define Q = U + D − ATA, H =
diag{ρQ, 1
ρ
I|E′|n}, and let u > 1 be an arbitrary constant,
then we have
‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖H≤ ‖ y
k − yk+1∗ ‖H√
1 + δ
(15)
if U +D −ATA is positive semi-definite and Assumptions
1, 2, and 3 are satisfied. In (15), ‖ x˜ ‖H=
√
x˜THx˜ and
δ = min{ (u− 1)Amin
uQmax
,
2mfAminρ
uL2 + ρ2AminQmax
}, (16)
where Qmax is the largest eigenvalue of Q, Amin is the
smallest nonzero eigenvalue of ATA, mf is the strongly
convexity modulus, and L is the Lipschitz modulus.
Proof: The results can be obtained following a similar
line of reasoning in [35]. The detailed proof is given in the
supplementary materials and can be found online [36].
Lemma 2: Let x∗ be the optimal solution, λk∗ be the
optimal multiplier to (14) at iteration k, and yk∗ =
[x∗T ,λk∗T ]T . Further define Q = U + D − ATA and
H = diag{ρQ, 1
ρ
I|E′|n}, then we have
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H≤‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H +p(k) (17)
if U +D −ATA is positive semi-definite and Assumptions
1, 2, and 3 are satisfied. In (17),
p(k) =
1√
ρAmin
‖ ▽hk+1(x∗)− ▽hk(x∗) ‖ (18)
where hk(x) =
2N∑
i=1
hki (xi).
Proof: The results can be obtained following a similar
line of reasoning in [35]. The detailed proof is given in the
supplementary materials and can be found online [36].
Lemma 3: Let x∗ be the optimal solution, λk∗ be the
optimal multiplier to (14) at iteration k, and yk∗ =
[x∗T ,λk∗T ]T . Further define Q = U + D − ATA and
H = diag{ρQ, 1
ρ
I|E′|n}, then we have
‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖H≤ ‖ y
k − yk∗ ‖H√
1 + δ
+
p(k)√
1 + δ
(19)
if U +D −ATA is positive semi-definite and Assumptions
1, 2, and 3 are satisfied.
Proof: Combining (15) and (17), we obtain the result
directly.
Lemma 3 indicates that ‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖H converges
linearly to a neighborhood of 0.
Theorem 2: Algorithm I is guaranteed to converge to the
optimal solution to (14) if U +D − ATA is positive semi-
definite and Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and Assumption
3 are satisfied.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Remark 2: It is worth noting that problem (14) is a
reformulation of problem (1). So Theorem 2 guarantees that
each agent’s state will converge to the optimal solution to
(1).
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We first present a numerical example to illustrate the
efficiency of the proposed approach. Then we compare our
approach with the differential-privacy based algorithm in
[18]. We conducted numerical experiments on the following
optimization problem.
min
x˜
N∑
i=1
‖ x˜− yi ‖2 (20)
with yi ∈ Rn. Each agent i deals with a private local
objective function
fi(xi) =‖ xi − yi ‖2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (21)
We used the above optimization problem (20) because it
is easy to verify whether the obtained value is the optimal
solution, which should be
∑
N
i=1 yi
N
. Furthermore, (20) makes
it easy to compare with [18], whose simulation is also based
on (20).
A. Evaluation of Our Approach
To solve the optimization problem (20), fαki (x˜) was set
to fαki (x˜) =
1
2 x˜
T x˜ + (bki )
T x˜ for our approach in the
simulations, where bki was set to b
k
i =
1
k+1ci + di with
ci ∈ Rn and di ∈ Rn being constants private to agent i. Fig.
4 visualizes the evolution of xαi and x
β
i (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in
one specific run where the network deployment is illustrated
in Fig. 3. All xαi and x
β
i (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) converged to the
optimal solution 13.758.
agent communication 
link
agent 1
agent 2
agent 3
agent 4
agent 5
agent 6
Fig. 3: A network of six agents (N = 6).
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Fig. 4: The evolution of xαi and x
β
i in our approach.
B. Comparison with the algorithm in [18]
Under the network deployment in Fig. 3, we compared
our privacy-preserving approach with the differential-privacy
based algorithm in [18]. We simulated the algorithm in [18]
under seven different privacy levels:
ǫ = 0.2, 1, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100.
In the objective function (20), yi was set to yi = [0.1× (i−
1)+0.1; 0.1× (i−1)+0.2]. The domain of optimization for
the algorithm in [18] was set to X = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x2+y2 ≤
1}. Note that the optimal solution [0.35; 0.45] resided in X .
Detailed parameter settings for the algorithm in [18] were
given as n = 2, c = 0.5, q = 0.8, p = 0.9, and
aij =


0.2 j ∈ Ni,
0 j /∈ Ni, j 6= i,
1−
∑
j∈Ni
aij i = j,
(22)
for i = 1, 2, ..., 6. In addition, the performance index d in
[18] was used to quantify the optimization error here, which
was computed as the average value of squared distances with
respect to the optimal solution over M runs [18], i.e.,
d =
6∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
‖ xli − [0.35; 0.45] ‖2
6M
.
Here xli is the obtained solution of agent i in the lth run.
For our approach, xli was calculated as the average of x
αl
i
and x
βl
i .
Simulation results from 5,000 runs showed that our ap-
proach converged to [0.35; 0.45] with an error d = 5.1 ×
10−4, which is negligible compared with the simulation
results under the algorithm in [18] (cf. Fig. 5, where each
differential privacy level was implemented for 5,000 times).
The results confirm the trade-off between privacy and accu-
racy in differential-privacy based approaches.
0 20 40 60 80 100
ǫ
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
d
the algorithm in [17]
our approach
Fig. 5: The comparison of our approach with the algorithm
in [18] in terms of optimization error.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach to enabling
privacy-preservation in decentralized optimization based on
function decomposition, which neither compromises the
optimality of optimization nor relies on an aggregator or
third party. Theoretical analysis confirms that an honest-but-
curious adversary cannot infer the information of neighbor-
ing agents even by recording and analyzing the information
exchanged in multiple iterations. In addition, our approach
can also avoid an external eavesdropper from inferring the
information of participating agents. Numerical simulation
results confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
From Lemma 3, we can obtain
√
1 + δ
k ‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H≤‖ y0 − y0∗ ‖H +
k−1∑
s=0
√
1 + δ
s
p(s).
(23)
Dividing both sides by
√
1 + δ
k
, we have
‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H≤ ‖ y
0 − y0∗ ‖H√
1 + δ
k
+
k−1∑
s=0
1
√
1 + δ
k−s p(s).
(24)
It is clear lim
k→∞
‖y0−y0∗‖H√
1+δ
k = 0 due to δ > 0. Now our main
goal is to prove lim
k→∞
∑k−1
s=0
1√
1+δ
k−s p(s) = 0. Recall that in
Assumption 3 we have lim
k→∞
fαki → fα∗i . Therefore, we have
lim
k→∞
hki → h∗i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N , i.e., hki converges
to a fixed function h∗i (h
k converges to a fixed function h∗).
On the other hand, we have
p(k) =
1√
ρAmin
‖ ▽hk+1(x∗)− ▽hk(x∗) ‖ . (25)
As a result of the convergence of hk, we have lim
k→∞
p(k) =
0. Therefore, we have that p(k) is bounded, i,e., there exists
a B such that p(k) ≤ B, ∀k. In addition, we have
∀ε1 > 0, ∃N1 ∈ N+, s.t. |p(k)| ≤ ε1, ∀k ≥ N1,
where N+ is the set of positive integers. Further letting η =
1√
1+δ
and F (k) =
∑k−1
s=0
1√
1+δ
k−s p(s), we have η ∈ (0, 1)
and
F (k) =
k−1∑
s=0
ηk−sp(s)
=
N1∑
s=0
ηk−sp(s) +
k−1∑
s=N1+1
ηk−sp(s)
≤ B
N1∑
s=0
ηk−s + ε1
k−1∑
s=N1+1
ηk−s
= Bηk
η−N1 − η
1− η + ε1
η − ηk−N1−1
1− η
≤ Bηk η
−N1 − η
1− η + ε1
η
1− η
(26)
for k ≥ N1 + 2.
Recalling η ∈ (0, 1), we have lim
k→∞
Bηk η
−N1−η
1−η = 0 and
∀ε = ε1 > 0, ∃N2 ∈ N+,
s.t. |Bηk η
−N1 − η
1− η | ≤ ε1, ∀k ≥ N2,
(27)
Therefore, we can obtain
∀ε = ε1 > 0, ∃N = max{N1, N2},
s.t. |F (k)| ≤ ε1 + ε1 η
1− η =
1
1− η ε1, ∀k ≥ N,
(28)
which proves that lim
k→∞
F (k) = 0. Then according to (24),
we have lim
k→∞
‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H= 0. Since ‖ xk − x∗ ‖Q≤‖
yk−yk∗ ‖H , we have lim
k→∞
‖ xk−x∗ ‖Q= 0 as well, which
completes the proof.
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B. Proof of Lemma 1
According to the update rules in (7) and (8) , we have
▽hk+1i (x
k+1
i ) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j + ρ(x
k+1
i − xkj )) + γiρ(xk+1i − xki ) = 0 (29)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N .
Let (x∗,λk∗) be the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points for (14) at iteration k, we have
−ATi λk∗ = ▽hki (x∗i )
Ax∗ = 0
(30)
where Ai indicates the columns of A corresponding to agent i. It is worth noting that since
2N∑
i=1
hki (xi) is strongly convex,
x∗ is the optimal solution to (14).
Since each hki is strongly convex, we have
(▽hk+1i (x
k+1
i )− ▽hk+1i (x∗i ))T (xk+1i − x∗i ) ≥ mf ‖ xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 . (31)
Combining the above equation with (29) and (30), we have
(−
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j + ρ(x
k+1
i − xkj ))− γiρ(xk+1i − xki ) +ATi λk+1∗)T (xk+1i − x∗i ) ≥ mf ‖ xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 . (32)
Noting that λk+1i,j = λ
k
i,j + ρ(x
k+1
i − xk+1j ), one has
(−
∑
j∈Ni
(λk+1i,j + ρ(x
k+1
j − xkj ))− γiρ(xk+1i − xki ) +ATi λk+1∗)T (xk+1i − x∗i ) ≥ mf ‖ xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 . (33)
Based on the definition of A, D, and U , one can further have
∑
j∈Ni
λk+1i,j = A
T
i λ
k+1, (34)
∑
j∈Ni
(xk+1j − xkj ) = (D −ATA)Ti (xk+1 − xk), (35)
γiρ(x
k+1
i − xki ) = ρUi(xk+1 − xk). (36)
Recall that Q = D −ATA+ U and Q = QT , we can combine (33) with the above three equations to obtain
(−ATi (λk+1 − λk+1∗)− ρQTi (xk+1 − xk))T · (xk+1i − x∗i ) ≥ mf ‖ xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 . (37)
Summing both sides of (37) over i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N and using
2N∑
i=1
(xk+1i − x∗i )T (Ai)T (λk+1 − λk+1∗) = (xk+1 − x∗)TAT (λk+1 − λk+1∗)
2N∑
i=1
(xk+1i − x∗i )TρQTi (xk+1 − xk) = ρ(xk+1 − x∗)TQT (xk+1 − xk)
we have
−(xk+1 − x∗)TAT (λk+1 − λk+1∗)− ρ(xk+1 − x∗)TQT (xk+1 − xk) ≥ mf ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2 (38)
Moreover, the following equalities can be obtained by using algebraic manipulations:
(xk+1 − x∗)TQT (xk+1 − xk) = 1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q +
1
2
(‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q − ‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q), (39)
(xk+1 − x∗)TAT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) = 1
ρ
(λk+1 − λk)T (λk+1 − λk+1∗) (40)
1
ρ
(λk+1 − λk)T (λk+1 − λk+1∗) = 1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 − 1
2ρ
‖ λk − λk+1∗ ‖2 + 1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 (41)
Based on the above three inequities, (38) can be rewritten as
mf ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≤− ρ
2
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q −
1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 +ρ
2
‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q +
1
2ρ
‖ λk − λk+1∗ ‖2
− ρ
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q −
1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2
(42)
Recall that H = diag{ρQ, 1
ρ
I|E|n} and yk = [xkT ,λkT ]T . The above inequality can be simplified as
2mf ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≤‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖2H − ‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H − ‖ yk+1 − yk ‖2H (43)
On the other hand, note that for any constant u > 1, the following relationship is true [35]
(u− 1) ‖ a− b ‖2≥ (1− 1
u
) ‖ b ‖2 − ‖ a ‖2 (44)
So we have
(u− 1) ‖ ▽hk+1(xk+1)− ▽hk+1(x∗) ‖2 = (u − 1) ‖ AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) + ρQT (xk+1 − xk) ‖2
≥ u− 1
u
‖ AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) ‖2 − ‖ ρQT (xk+1 − xk) ‖2 (45)
Since λk+1 and λk+1∗ lie in the column space of of A, we have [35]
‖ AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) ‖2≥ Amin ‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2
‖ ρQT (xk+1 − xk) ‖2≤ ρ2Qmax ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q
(46)
where Qmax is the largest eigenvalue of Q, Amin is the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of A
TA.
In addition, given that ‖ ▽hk+1(xk+1) − ▽hk+1(x∗) ‖2≤ L2 ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2 is true according to Assumption 3, using
(46) and (45), we can obtain
(u − 1)L2 ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≥ (u − 1)Amin
u
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 −ρ2Qmax ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q (47)
Using algebraic manipulations, the above inequality can be rewritten as
uQmax
(u− 1)Amin ρ ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2Q +
uL2
ρAmin
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≥ 1
ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 (48)
Adding uQmax(u−1)Amin
1
ρ
‖ λk+1−λk ‖2 and ρQmax ‖ xk+1−x∗ ‖2 to the left hand side of the above inequality, and adding
ρ ‖ xk+1−x∗ ‖2Q to the right hand side, we obtain the following inequality based on the fact ρ ‖ xk+1−x∗ ‖2Q≤ ρQmax ‖
xk+1 − x∗ ‖2:
uQmax
(u− 1)Amin (ρ ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2Q +
1
ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2) + ( uL
2
ρAmin
+ ρQmax) ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
≥ 1
ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 +ρ ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q
(49)
Let
δ = min{ (u− 1)Amin
uQmax
,
2mfAminρ
uL2 + ρ2AminQmax
} (50)
Inequality (49) becomes
1
δ
‖ yk+1 − yk ‖2H +
2mf
δ
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≥‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H (51)
Based on (43) and (51), we can get
1
δ
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖2H −
1
δ
‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H≥‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H (52)
which proves Lemma 1.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
First, we have
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H − ‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H≤‖ yk+1∗ − yk∗ ‖H (53)
On the other hand, we have
‖ yk+1∗ − yk∗ ‖H= 1√
ρ
‖ λk+1∗ − λk∗ ‖ (54)
‖ AT (λk+1∗ − λk∗) ‖=‖ ▽hk+1(x∗)− ▽hk(x∗) ‖ . (55)
Therefore, we can get the following inequality using (46)
‖ λk+1∗ − λk∗ ‖≤ 1√
Amin
‖ ▽hk+1(x∗)− ▽hk(x∗) ‖ . (56)
Combing (53) to (56), we obtain
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H≤‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H + 1√
ρAmin
‖ ▽hk+1(x∗)− ▽hk(x∗) ‖, (57)
which completes the proof of Lemma 2.
